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Abstract: Industrial democracy and corporate governance are intertwined 
discourses. In present-day use, however, the two expressions seem to represent 
as different perspectives as two related discursive traditions could become. At a 
time when calls have emerged for the intersection of the two narratives to be 
revisited, how the separation of these two related discourses occurred 
historically and what that separation has entailed seems of particular 
importance. The received corporate governance approach has become so 
dominant that it appears to have assumed the status of an ideology - an 
established way of thinking about the governance of corporations that is largely 
just assumed (rather than argued) in much financial and legal discourse. 
Seeking to understand why mainstream corporate governance scholarship has 
failed to engage with the historically key issue of industrial democratisation is 
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1 Introduction 
Industrial democracy and corporate governance are historically related notions, but that is 
not the impression one receives from introductory texts on corporate governance. From 
the other perspective, discussions of corporate governance often seem quite absent from 
journals such as Economic and Industrial Democracy or standard industrial relations 
textbooks. But in his 2013 contribution to the British Fabian Society’s The Great 
Rebalancing, the ‘Blue Labour’ peer Maurice Glasman calls for an industrial democracy 
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model to be adopted in British corporate governance, and recent developments in the 
pension (or superannuation) fund industry have similarly brought to the fore the issue of 
representation and ‘independence’ in commercial governance (Sayce et al., 2014). 
Glasman (2013) seeks to revisit and revive earlier debates regarding firm directorship and 
democratisation which have seemed largely forgotten in mainstream business governance 
discourse in the UK since the 1970s, as have similar advocates of employee 
representation on the boards of pension and superannuation funds (Markey et al., 2014). 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the main controversies regarding the governance of firms 
concerned union and worker involvement in decision-making processes. Of the major 
industrialised economies, only commentators from the US stood significantly outside the 
key debates of the time. By the 1980s, however, a new concern had arisen in the US, one 
that was soon to spread throughout the industrialised world. This new concern was for the 
first time labelled ‘corporate governance’, but was articulated in a manner which 
displaced previously mainstream narratives that equally centred on debates regarding the 
proper governance arrangements to be adopted by listed firms. The label ‘corporate 
governance’ was the umbrella under which a particular kind of business reform was 
advanced, replacing one discursive formation with another in a classical Foucauldian 
manner (Mees, 2015). 
This paper investigates how a socialist vision of democratised corporations was 
displaced by a liberal narrative derived from an implicit understanding that firms are 
characterised by a series of freely entered contracts. Where previous disputes regarding 
how firms should be governed focused on the lived experiences of employees within such 
enterprises (i.e. how their working lives are governed), a differently conceptualised 
approach that is primarily informed by liberal notions of contract displaced earlier 
understandings which invoked broader democratising aims and values. Rather than 
constituting an entrenched ‘variety of capitalism’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001), the liberal 
market approach to the governance of listed firms has seen a reconfiguration and 
obscuring of previous discourses of democratisation. Indeed, discourses of corporate 
governance have become so implicit and generally accepted in business thinking that 
corporate governance has itself arguably reached the level of an ideology, an ideology of 
financialisation (Ireland, 2009; Van der Zwan, 2014). A social democratic or partnership 
approach to the governance of listed firms has been abandoned in place of a politically 
and economically uneven narrative of social and economic contracts which neither 
reflects mainstream social sciences approaches to governance nor the broader historical 
development of the democratising ethic which had been such a mainstay of social 
sciences literature previously. 
2 Reforming narratives 
Considerations of the proper relationship between the employees, owners and directors of 
firms in a democratic society have a long history in Continental Europe where debates 
over worker representation and the effective functioning of governing boards were 
particularly common in the 1950s and 1960s (Neuloh, 1956; Meyers, 1958; Clegg, 1960; 
Czubek, 1968; Peterson, 1968; Blumberg, 1968; Emery and Thorsrud, 1969). Yet the 
notion of ‘corporate governance’ is commonly held to represent a quite different matter 
to that which led to the development of a requirement for employee-nominated directors 
on the boards of Scandinavian, German, Dutch and French firms (Haug, 2004a, 2004b; 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   46 B. Mees    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Müller-Jentsch, 2008; Conchon, 2013; Waddington and Conchon, 2016). Instead the 
intellectual tradition which has grown up about corporate governance since the 1960s has 
been limited by its development, particularly in terms of what Foucault (2003, pp.6–8) 
termed ‘global theory’. Foucault argued that the key challenge for historians of ideas is to 
interrogate the reasons for the subjugation of earlier knowledges by global approaches 
and to rescue alternative intellectual traditions which may have been too readily passed 
over and forgotten. And in the case of corporate governance, the ‘global theory’ is the 
agency approach, first formulated by the American economists Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). In keeping with the earlier work of Mitnick (1975), the agency approach to 
corporate governance stresses the primacy of the rights of shareholders (as those who 
company management legally ‘act for’) in reflection of an intellectual status quo that had 
already been formulated in the US in the 1930s, particularly in terms of the outcome of a 
debate between Berle (1931, 1932) and Dodd (1932, 1935) in the Harvard Law Review, 
but was revisited by Berle (1959) perhaps most pointedly in his Power without Property: 
A new development in the American political economy. 
As Foucault (2008, p.6) once famously put it, governance concerns the ‘conduire la 
conduite’ (regulation of behaviour) and is commonly held in the corporate context to be a 
different matter than management (Tricker, 2009). Corporations historically represent a 
legal structure, first developed to their present form in the nineteenth century, under 
which parliaments give certain legal protections to owners of corporations in order to 
encourage economic development. Before limited liability was introduced, for example, 
owners of firms could be imprisoned as debtors if the business failed (cf. the depiction of 
a debtors’ prison in Dickens’s Little Dorrit). The corporate form was created by 
parliaments for the sole purpose of aiding businesses to further develop the economic 
prospects of countries. 
Corporate governance is concerned, therefore, with corporations and securities law, 
legal enforcement, standards of practice, duties, control and the effective operation of 
governing boards. As such, corporate governance cannot reasonably be restricted only to 
matters of firm performance, shareholder value and the functioning of directorial 
subcommittees, but needs to be taken more broadly as a concept. Corporate governance 
reflects both how parliaments enact legislation in order to govern broader social 
relationships, but also how firms themselves govern their employees and other resources 
- i.e. broader aspects of political economy. First coined as an expression by Eells (1960), 
corporate governance is both a firm-external and internal concern, a matter of both public 
and private government (Eells, 1962; Mees, 2015). 
Industrial democracy, however, is a much older notion, but can also be understood as 
external or internal to a firm. First coined as an expression (démocratie industrielle) by 
Proudhon in the fifth edition of his Manual of the Stock Exchange Speculator (Proudhon 
1857, p.461), industrial democracy contrasts with corporate governance genealogically as 
originally representing a radical discourse inherited from the nineteenth century worker 
movement. Proudhon was a proponent of cooperatives and mutualisation, and is best 
known as a founder of the anarchist movement that rejected the authoritarian socialism of 
Lenin and Marx (Prichard, 2013). Workers’ councils had played a key role in the 
revolutionary movements in Germany, Italy and Russia, although in most cases they had 
been brought under union control by the 1920s (Eley, 2002, pp.160–164).  
Yet European industrial democracy also draws on Catholic social justice teaching as 
expressed in several papal writings, from the seminal encyclical Rerum novarum of Pope 
Leo XIII (1983) even to the writings of the conservative Pope St John Paul II who 
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stressed in his Laborem exercens (John Paul 1981, III, 15) that “[t]he principle of the 
priority of labour over capital is a postulate of the order of social morality.” The external 
notion of industrial democracy, as articulated by Webb and Webb (1897), concerns the 
rights of workers to join unions and to be represented by these external bodies in 
industrial bargaining, grievance handling and other kinds of employment matters. 
Internally, however, industrial democracy has usually been envisaged in the form of 
works councils, employee participation in decision-making, health and safety 
committees, and the election of worker directors to both pension-fund trustee boards and 
to the supervisory boards of publically listed business entities (Markey et al., 2010). 
Jensen and Meckling’s seminal statement of agency theory appeared during the time 
of the first major corporate governance debates in the US which arose after the 
spectacular failure of the Penn Central Transportation Company in 1970 (Daughen and 
Binzen, 1971; Sobel, 1977; Cheffins, 2013, 2015; Mees, 2015). Eells’s work analysing 
the business corporation from a political-economy perspective seemed largely to have 
been forgotten by this time. But when his expression ‘corporate governance’ returned to 
the mainstream of business discourse, it did so in a much noisier manner than Eells had 
first proposed. The 1970s were the heyday of corporate activists such as Ralph Nader, 
and one of Nader’s groups of consumer crusaders had even published a report into 
American corporate governance at the time that argued in favour of what would later 
become known as the stakeholder model of corporate governance (Graham, 2000; 
Marcello, 2004). The Nader report, Taming the Giant Corporation (Nader et al., 1976), 
was particularly focused on how senior management groups had in many instances 
become contemptuous of both consumers and shareholders. Nader and his supporters 
argued that US corporations needed to be regulated to force them to be more responsible 
not just to their shareholders, but also to societal concerns more generally. 
By the 1970s, however, the even more fundamental reforms envisioned by advocates 
of industrial democracy on the European Continent had spread to the UK. Ever since 
Great Britain had entered the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, questions 
had been raised over the traditional structure of publically quoted British companies.  
After the war, the continental European model of two boards - one managing and one 
supervisory - had been further adapted in countries such as West Germany to 
accommodate the often-opposing interests of management and non-executive employees. 
Works councils of various forms had been current in German experience since the late 
nineteenth century as an ‘experiment in industrial democracy’ (Guillebaud, 1928) and 
these bodies had been strengthened after the war by the adoption of the first West 
German codetermination (Mitbestimmung) legislation (McGaughey, 2015). First 
developed in 1951 at a time when employers were still in a particularly weak political 
position (and, as McGaughey observes, not forced upon the country by the Allies as has 
often been claimed), in 1976 the German parliament had even extended the number of 
employee-elected positions on German supervisory boards to 50% in large enterprises 
(i.e. those with over 2,000 employees). German-style codetermination was duly presented 
as an alternative business structure, tried and tested in the EEC’s dominant economy, and 
constituted a quite different model for the modern British public company (Mertens and 
Schanze, 1979; Havlovic, 1990; Fetzer, 2010). 
In 1975, the Labour government of Harold Wilson consequently appointed a 
commission of inquiry to respond to the matters raised in the European Commission’s 
Draft Fifth Company Law Directive, the first version of which (published in 1972) 
proposed the institution of a modified West German system of corporate governance right 
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across the EEC. The Draft Fifth Directive was intended as an EEC-wide company-law 
harmonisation measure that would protect West German businesses from ‘social 
dumping’ - i.e. it would stop multinationals from employing their staff in member 
countries that had the worst employment protections (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1972; Dalton, 1974; Conlon, 1975; Schmitthoff, 1976; Bullock, 1977; 
Davies and Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, 1977; Creighton, 1977; Gold, 2010).  
The Conservative Party had duly proposed amending British company law to include a 
statutory duty for directors to take into account the interests of both shareholders and 
employees (Department of Trade and Industry, 1973). But when the Labour government 
responded with a White Paper on industrial democracy in 1978, British business groups 
were appalled. The committee of inquiry led by the historian (and Labour peer) Allan 
Bullock concentrated on how electing union representatives to company boards might 
lead to less industrial conflict in light of the undeniable economic success of West 
German firms under codetermination. Nonetheless as the government of James Callaghan 
(Wilson’s Labour Party successor) moved into crisis during the strike-riddled ‘Winter of 
Discontent’ of 1978–1979, the UK’s industrial democracy model for the public company 
soon disappeared from the mainstream policy agenda (Lopez, 2014; Williamson, 2016). 
The majority report of the Bullock committee had proposed the adoption of a single 
board in British public companies of over 2000 employees with worker-elected directors 
making up as many members of the board as shareholder-elected directors, with the 
remainder being independent of both unions and shareholders (the 2x + y model). As the 
committee noted (Bullock, 1977, p.41): 
it seems to us (as it did to most witnesses) that to regard the company as solely 
the property of shareholders is to be out of touch with the reality of the present 
day company as a complex social and economic entity, subject to a variety of 
internal and external pressures, in which the powers of control have passed 
from the legal owners to professional management. 
The minority report, prepared by the industrialists on the committee (who were 
constrained by the committee’s terms of reference to advise on how, not whether 
codetermination should be implemented), instead recommended a dual-board model more 
along the lines which obtained in West Germany. 
The Bullock report proved an immediate failure, however. Upon its publication in 
January 1977, the industrial democracy proposals were loudly criticised by the 
Confederation of British industry (CBI) The CBI opposed the matter of union-appointed 
directors outright. The Callaghan government in turn quickly retreated, its White Paper 
published in May 1978 refusing to “impose a standard pattern of participation on industry 
by law” (Department of Employment 1978, p.2), calling instead for the extension of 
participation through industrial agreements (Wedderburn of Charlton, Lord, 1984; Carter, 
1989; Williamson, 2016). Indeed, with the 1979 replacement of Callaghan as British 
Prime Minster by the Conservative Party’s Margaret Thatcher, experiments with worker 
directors in nationalised industries were ended and the EEC proposals for 
codetermination were comprehensively rebuffed. Despite British companies such as ICI 
still experimenting with works councils in the late 1970s, the idea of industrial 
democracy quickly disappeared from the British public agenda. 
Instead, a new discourse arose in the 1980s. Reversing the direction of influence 
which had traditionally applied in such matters, the British approach to public company 
governance reform would become increasingly American in style and focus during the 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   Industrial democracy and corporate governance 49    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Prime Ministership of Thatcher and her Conservative successor John Major, with British 
public companies appointing an increasing number of non-executive or independent 
directors, establishing audit and nominating committees, and pursuing other comparable 
ways of improving firm performance through formal mechanisms of governance (Mees, 
2015). Any suggestions of industrial democracy were now seen as too radical (much as 
the terms of reference of the Bullock committee had described the proposed adoption of 
codetermination). Clearly understood as an Americanism, ‘corporate governance’ was 
imported into the UK during the 1980s at the discursive expense of codetermination. 
Instead of in terms of democratisation, the boards of British public companies were 
reformed in a manner which sought to increase economic efficiency and to better 
represent the interests solely of shareholders. 
3 Employee participation and representation 
The British situation previously had been mixed. The Webbs had opposed worker 
involvement in management originally because of the low reputation that British 
employee shareholding schemes had achieved in the late nineteenth century, but by 1920 
had come around to an acceptance of union involvement in the management of industry 
(Webb and Webb, 1920; McGaughey, 2014). Whitley Works Committees had also been 
formed in many industries between the two World Wars in a Taylorist attempt to ‘tap 
labour’s brains’ (Cooke and Murray, 1940), but most of the UK’s Joint Industrial 
Councils had been abolished by the 1970s (Stitt, 2006; Patmore, 2016). British trade 
unions did not actively seek to become involved in German-style codetermination 
arrangements until the 1960s (McGaughey, 2014; Williamson, 2016). 
In the US, works councils and employee involvement in industrial decision-making 
had first been advocated during the First World War, but had subsequently been 
advanced more successfully by advocates of Taylorism as a method for improving 
production processes. Joint labour-management arrangements were advocated most 
notably by Morris Cooke, Frederick Taylor’s ghost writer (i.e. the actual author of  
The Principles of Scientific Management), as the Taylor movement (particularly after 
Taylor’s death) attempted to extend Taylor’s ‘mental revolution’ by engaging union 
support (Cooke and Murray, 1940; Derber, 1970; Wrege and Stotka, 1978; Lichtenstein 
and Harris, 1993; McCartin, 1998; Summers, 2000; Bruce and Nyland, 2011; Nyland  
et al., 2014). Works councils were judged especially effective when considering technical 
aspects of production and were a key development in the emergence of codetermination 
in Europe. Even the dream of a more rational fixing of rates of remuneration (partly as a 
reflection of the Socialist Calculation debates being held in Europe at the same time) was 
reflected in the late Taylorist experimentation with works councils (Auerbach and 
Sotiropoulos, 2014). Works councils in Europe have since tended to be mostly involved 
in employee-centred concerns such as occupational health and safety, employee 
discipline and redundancy entitlements. More traditional industrial matters could be 
resolved by joint union-management consultative committees or other similar bodies. 
In the UK, a successful system of mandatory worker-employer participation had 
nonetheless been instituted in the health and safety area on the recommendations of the 
Robens Report (1972), and similar arrangements had long obtained on the boards of 
pension funds, particularly in the US where the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 had limited 
union participation on the boards of retirement-savings plans to 50% (McCarthy, 2014). 
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The UK’s industrial democracy proposals of the late 1970s, however, also reflected a 
uniquely British concern in which industrial relations was largely unregulated, an 
environment that had led to an ungoverned industrial system where wild-cat strikes and 
disputes even within unions were very much the order of the day (Fox, 1985). Rather 
than adopting German-style codetermination, the response under Thatcher was to 
regulate union activity and industrial relations more generally (Marsh, 1991; Shackleton, 
1998). But in the 1970s, industrial democracy seemed to have a particular salience 
throughout much of the Western world and had led to the expectation among many of its 
proponents that its adoption was inevitable. 
Yet the development of a new discourse of corporate reform in the US in the 1970s 
rapidly led to the dominance of a renewed shareholder-primacy approach to corporate 
governance. As Milton Friedman had argued since the 1960s (Friedman, 1962), 
corporations existed to make money, and the main claimants on that profit had been 
intended to be shareholders historically, not management elites or workers. The new 
American economic approach to corporate governance that first arose in the 1970s 
quickly became principally focused on maximising returns to shareholders, not issues of 
democratisation (Mees, 2015). Works councils and worker directors seemed quite outside 
the bounds of the new discourse of American corporate governance reform. 
Much of the discussion of industrial democracy in the Anglo-Saxon countries has 
subsequently seen the scope of the democratising narrative retreat to that of the external 
model promoted in the late nineteenth century by the Webbs or to an even more etiolated 
management-controlled model of ‘participation’ or ‘voice’ (Bixler, 1985; Mitchell, 1998; 
Budd, 2004; Wilkinson et al., 2010). Industrial democracy in this understanding is to be 
restricted to the right of workers’ voices to be heard through their unions - bodies 
external to the firm - or are reduced to a purely consultative (and often only token) role. 
Under codetermination, it is the firm itself which is democratised as shareholder rights to 
be represented on the board of governance are balanced with those of the right of 
employees to be heard. The American discourse of corporate governance, however, does 
not consider democratisation at all, with emphasising the rights of shareholders (over 
management) often serving as a proxy for democratisation more generally. 
Most of the focus of liberal reform in the US has been argued in terms of contractual 
shareholder rights. Figures such as Robert Monks (Rosenberg, 1998) have campaigned 
unabashedly for the property rights of shareholders to be upheld, not for those of 
employees or society more generally. Nader’s approach was to focus more on consumers, 
extending the democratic franchise from shareholders to shareholders and consumers. 
While Monks sought to democratise corporations from the perspective of their nominal 
owners, Nader and his followers sought democratisation principally from the perspective 
of their customers. 
By the 1980s, Nader (1984) had despaired of achieving real reform from the 
perspective of corporate governance. Yet his focus on stakeholders lived on. When 
stakeholder theory had first been formally propounded by Dill (1975), however, it was 
seen principally from the perspective of firm strategy - how could a business best manage 
its relationships with each of its key constituencies? In the 1980s, business ethicist Ed 
Freeman (1984) further developed the stakeholder approach along Rawlsian lines (Rawls, 
1971), underscoring the liberal understanding of the firm as a series of contracts. Further 
‘constitutionalising’ (Miller, 1959) of the American corporation occurred with the 
introduction of conservation laws, prohibitions on discrimination in hiring and the further 
strengthening of the legal rights of shareholders, employees and consumers. In 1986, for 
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example, the US Supreme Court confirmed the right of women employees to sue for 
sexual harassment and in 1992 federal proxy rules for shareholders were amended in a 
manner that allowed investors to increase their ability to communicate with each other 
(Anderson, 1987; Schwab and Thomas, 1998). But such an approach to democratising 
US business remains an external (or restricted/token) one, not internal (and actual) as in 
the European codetermination model. 
This externalising has since become the norm in all of the Anglo-Saxon countries.  
In the externalised model of industrial democracy, employee voices within the firm are 
managed by unions and senior management. Rather than a fully democratised model, a 
paternalistic approach instead often ensues. With declining union membership, employee 
voice retreats to a form of managed employee participation which is at best semi-
democratic. Instead of corporate democracies, listed firms remain largely undemocratised 
under contemporary conceptualisations of corporate governance and industrial 
democracy. The external model seems to conflict with the broader social-democratic 
standards which are customarily advanced in most other areas of the political economy 
today. 
The contractual American agency model of the firm also seems discontinuous with 
the development of management thought more generally. The main problem with the 
external model from a management history perspective is not merely the defeat of late 
Taylorism (with the advocacy of employee involvement in decision-making by Taylor’s 
successors such as Cooke) that this development reflects, but that it encourages the form 
of managerialist paternalism that resurfaced so obviously in the organisational 
development movement of the 1980s. Where concerns about employee anomie and the 
negative influence that organisational structures can have on personal development were 
once at the fore in organisational studies (Mayo, 1949; Argyris, 1957; Blauner, 1964; 
Maslow, 1965), the focus on improving firm performance which was characteristic of the 
neo-human relations movement is often manipulative and coercive in nature, its 
associated discipline of leadership studies often simply totalitarian (i.e. one of ‘total 
claim’) (Bracher, 1984, p.47; Hawkins, 1997; Pinha e Cuna et al., 2010; Godard, 2014). 
Very little acknowledgement of the notions of democratisation which underpinned older 
understandings of industrial democracy is represented in this literature. 
Nonetheless in Continental Europe, works councils were the subject of new 
regulation in 1994 (renewed in 2009) as employee participation has become a mandatory 
aspect of the EU’s social democracy agenda (Council of the European Union, 1994; 
Gold, 2010; Lecher et al., 2002; Whittall et al., 2007). The EEC’s Draft Fifth Directive 
was finally abandoned in 2004, but two years later a review of codetermination in 
Germany resulted in conservative Chancellor Angela Merkel publicly supporting its role 
in the ‘social market economy’ (Biedenkopf, 2006; Silvia, 2013, p.60). Renewed British 
debates concerning the wisdom of the American approach to corporate governance are 
represented in Lord Glasman’s appeal to revisit industrial democracy and recent Trades 
Union Congress studies in the UK (Williamson et al., 2014). In fact in July 2016 the 
soon-to-be British Prime Minister Theresa May even promised “we’re going to have not 
just consumers represented on company boards, but employees as well” (if only to recant 
several months later) (May 2016). The financial crisis of 2008 has led to new criticism of 
the neoliberal model of corporate governance triumphantly claimed to represent an ‘end 
of history’ by two Harvard business professors in 2001 shortly before the collapse of 
Enron (Hansmann and Kraakmann, 2001). But no mention of such matters appears in 
Durisin and Puzone’s 2009 survey of the ‘maturation of corporate governance research’ 
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or even Thomas Donaldson’s (2012) more recent epistemic critique of agency theory, 
much as if industrial democracy has been totally eclipsed from the canonical narratives of 
contemporary corporate governance. 
The decline of industrial democracy in the US in the 1940s and 1950s led to the 
removal of the theme from the business school literature. A continued matter of interest 
in Europe and the UK throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the only American academic 
contributions to the democratising debate during this period seem to have been dismissals 
of industrial democracy on (unclear) economic grounds (Sturmthal, 1964; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1979; Jacoby, 1985a, 1985b; Dickman, 1987; Frege, 2006). An American 
League for Industrial Democracy has existed since 1905, but even Nader, whose 
advocates styled his reform proposals ‘corporate democracy’, criticised industrial-
democracy initiatives as unworkable in the US (Nader et al., 1976; Johnpoll and 
Yerburgh, 1980). Subsumed in much subsequent literature under the less charged 
description of ‘employee participation’, industrial democratisation has been displaced 
from the canonical narratives of business reform by shareholder-primacy models of 
corporate governance. As Raymond Williams (1961) stressed, however, democratisation 
was one of the key social and cultural developments of the twentieth century, and 
remains an outstanding matter of tension in the contemporary political economy. 
4 Pension fund governance 
It is this displacement of notions of industrial democracy at the expense of corporate 
governance discourse which most characterises contemporary discussions of the role of 
‘independent’ trustees on pension and superannuation fund boards (Gold, 2008). Pension 
funds (or superannuation funds as they were formerly known in the UK) have 
traditionally been governed on industrial democracy grounds, with seats shared among 
employer and employee trustees, in a manner often described as ‘representative’ rather 
than ‘democratic’ - in fact with the number of employee representatives often regulated 
(Sayce and Gold, 2011). Many occupational pension plans were won as the result of 
industrial campaigns and their trustees are consequently described in union literature as 
stewards of ‘workers’ capital’ (Westar and Verma, 2007; Habbard, 2011). And as the 
representatives of workers, unions have long had an especial interest in the safekeeping 
of employees’ retirement-savings funds. Yet the industrial democracy model of pension 
and superannuation fund governance is currently under assault, as advocates of corporate 
governance thinking aim to extend the listed corporation model into the retirement-
savings arena. 
Applying the corporate governance principle of independence to pension fund boards 
has been a growing feature of American public pension schemes where inside directors 
(representing government employers) have often failed the beneficiaries of the plans 
(Hess and Impavido, 2004; Ambachtsheer, 2007). Requirements to include independent 
trustees were also introduced in the UK under the Occupational Pension Schemes 
(Charges and Governance) Regulations 2015, but not in a manner that (as yet) disturbs 
pre-existing industrial democracy arrangements. Instead, the anti-democratic nature of 
the calls for fund trustee ‘independence’ are best demonstrated in Australia where in 
2015 the conservative government introduced legislation to mandate a minimum of one-
third independent trustees on superannuation fund boards with a recommendation that 
funds move to a 50% quota, much as applies for Australian listed companies 
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(Frydenberg, 2015). The legislation was eventually defeated, but contrary evidence 
produced by advocates of the industrial democracy model employed in union-sponsored 
retirement-savings plans was summarily dismissed by the government at the time 
(Markey et al., 2014). 
A similar debate is presently occurring in the UK. Mandatory employee involvement 
was introduced under the UK Pensions Act 2004 on the basis that it would improve fund 
accountability, but groups such as BESTrustees and Law Debenture have continued to 
advocate for more independent trustees to be appointed to pension fund boards (Maton, 
2010; Farand, 2014). Independent trustees are being promoted both by academic and 
professional opinion as a way of improving the performance of British pension funds in 
terms of improving ‘board capital’ (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) at the expense of 
employer and employee representatives. The notion that retirement savings funds are a 
key form of ‘union business’ is typically passed over in these debates, as is the lack of 
employee involvement in traditional corporate governance thinking. Employee 
representatives are widely held to have the equivalent ‘outsider’ function as independent 
directors do in the mainstream pension funds governance literature (Hess, 2005), but this 
matter has also been passed over by the advocates of independent trustees. More 
independents necessarily means a better functioning board according to the proponents of 
this corporate governance model, even if the agency problems of a retirement-savings 
fund are obviously quite different from those which apply in a listed corporate entity 
(Sayce et al., 2014). The notion of independence derived from corporate governance 
discourse has clearly spread into the retirement-savings area in an ideological rather than 
a democratic or evidence-based manner. 
5 Organisational studies 
A key theme in the business ethics literature is how a democratic organisational culture 
may encourage employees to take responsibility for their actions, whereas a more 
authoritarian one may not (Trevino, 1986). As Denhart (1981, p.32) expresses it “we 
originally sought to construct social institutions that would reflect our values and beliefs; 
now there is the danger that our values would reflect our institutions”. But the plethora of 
ethics codes and value statements promoted in contemporary business practice often 
seem more to represent instruments of social control, rather than expressions of 
democratisation. Similarly, although the stakeholder approach was first proposed in 
reaction to the influence of Nader’s attacks on US corporations (Dill, 1975), Donaldson 
(2012) observes that interests other than those of managers and shareholders are often 
dismissed in the mainstream of corporate governance literature. Arguments over who the 
‘residual claimants’ on the profits of the firm should be often boil down to disagreements 
along the grounds of what Donaldson (2012, p.269) characterises as an ideological 
preference of the “I like oysters and think everyone should eat oysters” versus “I like 
strawberries and think everyone should eat strawberries” variety. Jensen (2002), for 
example dismisses stakeholder theory as politicising and irrational, while Freeman et al. 
(2004, p.364) defend their approach by criticising ‘shareholder ideologists’ who ‘serve 
neither truth nor freedom’. The demarcation between stakeholder theorists and the 
mainstream of corporate governance research may again here be characterised as a 
reflection of an implicit debate over democratisation. 
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Similar criticisms can also be raised of other liberal approaches to democratisation - 
the 2012 call to make Britain a ‘John Lewis economy’ by former Deputy Prime Minister 
(and Liberal Democrat leader) Nick Clegg was made without cognizance of the 
degeneration of democratic structures which have been a recent characteristic of the John 
Lewis Partnership, one of the largest employee-owned firms in Europe (Cathcart, 2014; 
Paranque and Willmott, 2014). As Hartmann (2014) claims, it is in studies of ‘alternative 
organisations’ (in the sense of alternatively governed ones) where empirical and 
ideological claims concerning the democratisation of firm governance can most 
profitably be examined, modelled and explained. The lack of comprehensive studies of 
the effects of labour trustees on pension fund performance directly reflects the lack of 
interest shown by corporate governance researchers on the influence of employee 
directors, mutualism (and demutualisation), employee ownership, cooperative ownership, 
and other forms of formal business democratisation generally in the field. The eclipse of 
the discourse of democratisation in the 1980s has been a key influence in many fields of 
organisational study, not merely that of the mainstream of explicitly corporate 
governance-focused discourse itself. 
6 Conclusion 
Hayek (1944, p.98) claimed in his Road to Serfdom that “what matters is that we have 
some choice”, that “there is almost always a way for the able” to leave a job that 
“becomes quite intolerable.” And similarly, in his recent book Democracy: Where and 
Where Not Gray (2011) considers the relationship of US business to American 
democracy purely in terms of whether corporations should be able to influence the 
political process - there seems to be a general lack of understanding in such works that 
democracy is not something necessarily external to the firm, but that it is something that 
can take place within it. As Ellerman (1990, p.32) has stressed, “[d]iscussions of 
corporate governance are often clouded by insufficient attention to the distinction 
between those who are governed by the corporation and those whose interests are only 
affected by the firm.” The fundamental question of political economy - how should we be 
governed? - seems to be absent from most debates in corporate governance. It is as if the 
concept of democracy has somehow become alien to the narrative tradition which obtains 
in corporate governance circles in the main liberal-market economies currently. 
Corporate governance is duly seen today by its critics largely as an impossibly 
conservative, neo-liberal project - indeed much as if it were an inversion of the older 
movement towards industrial democracy. As Donaldson (2012) adumbrates, the agency 
approach to corporate governance has tended to crowd out other normative concerns in 
the associated intellectual discourse. Beginning as a call for business governance reform, 
for democratising American corporations, since the 1980s narratives of corporate 
governance, particularly in their agency-theory form, have been conceptualised 
predominately as management and shareholder-focused. Originally advanced in terms of 
democratisation, corporate governance is now articulated predominately in a manner 
significantly at odds with earlier ideals of industrial democratisation. Yet the main 
criticisms of contemporary corporate governance theory and practice tend to be liberal 
and contractual in their nature, stressing how businesses should be more responsible to 
the societies that give them legal licence, for them to treat all their stakeholders 
reasonably and nicely. Democratisation in this model makes appeal only to the broader 
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social licence enjoyed by listed entities, not to their formal democratisation. Debates 
about stakeholder representation and corporate social responsibility have often acted to 
obscure rather than focus on the key issue that was encapsulated in earlier debates over 
industrial democratisation. Indeed the democratising of the governance of business 
entities is not even considered in much contemporary corporate governance discourse, 
solutions to wider issues of social concern typically being proposed either through the 
means of developing more focus on personal ethics, corporate public engagement or a 
clearer regulation of the nature of the duties of managers and directors towards business 
stakeholders in a liberal-contractual view of the nature of the firm. 
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